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ABSTRACT
TheEconomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 mandated the most
substantial reduction in personal income tax rates since
the tax cuts of 1964. The rate reductions stimulated
debates about the responsiveness of taxpayers to tax rates
and incentives, the magnitude of the foregonerevenue, and
the distribution of the tax burden. Thispaper provides
estimates of these three parameters.
A baseline income distribution was created which took
the macroeconomic environment of 1982 as given. This
distribution is contrasted with the actual income reported
in 1982 to measure the added reporting of income as a
result of the rate cuts. The National Bureau of Economic
Research TAXSIM model was used to estimate the effects of
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The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 mandated the most
substantial reduction in personal income tax rates since
the tax cuts of 1964. Beginning in 1982, tax rates were
reduced 10 percent from previous levels and the top
marginal rate bracket was set at 50 percent. The tax rate
reductions stimulated debates about three key issues: the
responsiveness of taxpayers to tax rates and incentives,
the magnitude of the foregone revenue and its importance in
increasing the federal budget deficit, and the implications
of the rate cut for the distribution of the tax burden.
The present paper provides estimates of the magnitude of
these three parameters.
It is the magnitude, not the existence of economic
feedback effects which is controversial within the
economics profession. For instance, it is well established
that the level of economic activity is influenced by the
level of taxes levied, although the size, and sometimes the
direction of this effect may be disputed. Similarly, the
taxation of labor supply or taxation of the return to
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saving affects the level of those activities. There is
also substantial evidence that the demand forvarious
commoditiesrelated to the personal income tax suchas
charitable giving and business travel are hiqhiy price
sensitive.
Regardless of its magnitude, the existence of a
behavioral response on the part of taxpayers affects the
revenue cost of the tax change. When the Department of
Treasury or the Congressional Budget Office analyzes the
revenue cost of a reduction in tax rates or the prospective
revenue increase from an increase in taxes, it does so in a
"behaviorally neutral" context. That is, the feedback
effect of higher tax rates on tax revenues is not
considered. Many of the estimates of the cost of the act
used in the debate about the tax cut and its contribution
to the deficit are based on these behaviorally neutral
estimates. Furthermore, the magnitude of the rate
reduction from 70 percent to 50 percent makes testable the
hypothesis that tax rates were being levied above their
revenue maximizing level.
The measurement of these magnitudes requires the
creation of a baseline estimate of revenue which holds all
factors except for taxpayer behavior constant. Thus, the
macroeconomic environment of 1982 is taken as given. To
the extent that aggregate income was changed by the tax
rate reductions, this paper underestimates the total
revenue response to the tax change—3—
The first section examines the existing works on the
effect of tax cuts on revenue both from a demand side and a
supply side perspective. Other estimates of the effect of
the 1982 rate reductions are also considered. The second
section describes the methodology used to estimate baseline
revenue. The final section presents estimates of the
actual revenue cost of the 1982 rate reductions both in the
aggregate and by income class.
Section 1: Existing Estimates of the Relation Between
Tax Rates and Tax Revenues
The academic investigation of the effect of taxation on
economic activity has been divided into two parts: the
"demand" side effects of taxes in the macroeconomic
context, and the "supply" side, microeconomic decisions,
which in the aggregate determine the macro economy. This
section examines this literature by first focussing on the
demand side impact of tax reductions. Then, the literature
on the "supply side" response is considered. Finally,
existing estimates of the response to the 1982 tax cut are
examined.
A leading proponent of demand side responses is Walter
Heller, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the
Kennedy Administration. During that tenure he advocated a
substantial reduction in tax rates. That rate reduction,
which brought the top rate down from 91 percent to 70
percent and lowered other rates as well, corresponded to an
actual increase in both real and nominal tax revenue after
its implementation. However, Heller argues that the cause—4—
of this revenue rise had nothing to do with "supply side"
effects. Heller argues:
"The record is crystal clear that it was its
stimulus to demand [his emphasis], the
multiplied impact of its release of over $10
billion of consumer purchasing power and $2
billion of corporate funds that powered the
1964-65 expansion and restored a good part of
the initial revenue loss
By this line of reasoning, the effect of the Keynesian
multiplier on the initial injection of aggregate demand
caused by the tax cut produces sufficient added revenue to
recapture the initial cut in taxes.
A similar "demand side" evaluation was made by Donald
Kiefer of the Library of Congress in studying the proposed
Kemp—Roth tax cut. However, Kiefer maintains that Heller's
view of the cause of the revenue response to the 1964 rate
reductions is empirically impossible:
For a tax cut to be self—financing, its impact on
the economy would have to be so large that the new
tax revenue generated would more than compensate
for the original revenue loss. Total Federal
taxes in the U.S. claim roughly 20 percent of GNP.
Thus, for a tax cut to increase Federal revenues,
rather than add to the deficit, it would have to
increase GNF by a multiple of 5 times its original
size or more. No analysis of fiscal policy in the
U.S. economy has concluded that such a high multi-
plier for an overall tax cut is possible. The
major econometric models of the U.S. economy all
have multiplier effects for various fiscal poli-
cies which range from about 1.3 to 2. Therefore,
a tax cut will reduce tax revenue by about 60 to
75 percent of the original amount of the reduc-
tion, with the remainder replaced by revenue from
the feedback effect.2
Kiefer was commenting on the original Kemp—Roth tax cut
proposal which, in modified form, was enacted into law in—5—
1981. He did not consider any alternative possibilities
which might have caused the revenue response of the 1960s.
In order to buttress his case, he placed the tax cut in the
context of three major macroeconomic models of theeconomy
beginning in 1978. The first year of the tax cut was
estimated to cost $25 billion dollars. The models all
estimated significant increases in the Federal deficit as a
result: $21.1 billion at DRI, $19.8 billion at Wharton,
and a $12.4 billion deficit increase from a smaller tax cut
at Chase Econometrics. These figures support his claim
that the increase in aggregate demand would only be
sufficient to recoup 60 to 75 percent of the rate
reduction.
It should be noted that when the tax cut experiment
Heller described was performed, an accomodative monetary
policy was in place. In 1978, the year of the Kiefer
study, monetary policy was tighter than in the 1960s,
though much more accomodative than during the 1982 tax
cuts. Taking account of the monetary regime of 1982,
Gregory Mankiw and Lawrence Summers3 estimated that the
demand side effects of the 1982 rate reductions were
actually negative. They argue that given fixed cash
balances, the effect of the tax cut was to place a higher
fraction of funds with households, who have a lower income
velocity of money than does the economy at large. The
result would therefore be a decline in nominal GNP from the
level it would otherwise have attained.The above discussion makes clear that monetary policy
is a choice for decision makers entirely independent of
whether or not a tax cut is taking place. A large demand
side response to a tax cut can be observed in some
instances and a small (or negative) demand side response to
an identical tax cut can be observed in other instances.
The magnitude of any demand side response does not depend
solely on the tax cut, but on other policy variables as
well. It therefore makes little sense to evaluate the
behavioral response to a tax cut by estimating demand side
responses. The present paper therefore ignores these
responses by taking the level of nominal income in 1982 as
given.
The literature on the effect of taxes on microeconomic
decisions, or "supply side" phenomenon, is largely divided
into analyses of the demand for specific commodities or the
supply of particular commodities. For example,
Feldstein,4 Boskin5 and many others have noted the
effect of capital income taxation on saving and therefore
on the long run supply of capital in the economy. Burtless
and Hausman6, Rosen7 and others have estimated the
effect of taxes on labor supply.
These estimates of the detrimental effects of taxation
on factor supply were incorporated into a general
equilibrium model of the economy by Fullerton, Shoven, and
Whalley.8 Fullerton9 used this general equilibrium
model of the economy to estimate the impact of tax rates on—7—
revenues. Federal, state, and local taxes on both capital
and labor were modelled. He concluded that current
marginal tax rates on gross labor income (of roughly 32
percent) and reasonable estimates of labor supply
elasticities did not suggest that aggregate revenues could
be increased by reductions in the average marginal tax
rates. Fullerton left open the possibility that tax rate
reductions on portions of the schedule ——atthe top
particularly -—couldincrease revenue.
Canto, Joines, and Laffer1° performed a less detailed
procedure using a two—sector model with one --thehouse-
hold sector ——untaxed.A decrease in tax rates causes
factors in the household sector to seek the higher net
rewards available in the taxable market sector. The
revenue maximizing tax rate depends on the output
elasticity with respect to tax rates. Their model depends
crucially on the absence of income effects and comple—
mentarity of production and consumption of public and
private goods. However, it reaches the opposite conclusion
from Fullerton.
Both of these studies relied on factor supply as the
key behavioral response to changes in tax rates. However,
there is no reason to suspect factor supply as either the
sole or even the dominant way that changes in tax rates
affect tax revenue. Changes in portfolio behavior and the
form of compensation employees receive may be of more
consequence.—8—
For example, Feldstein and Slemrod1 argued that a
reduction in the effective tax rate on capital gains would
Increase revenue from the sale of capital assets. The data
on capital gains tax revenues since then suggests they were
probably correct.
Clotfelter12 suggested a strong relationship between
the after—tax price and the use of business travel and
entertainment by partnerships. Travel and entertainment
expenses reduce partnership gross income. Neither income
nor payroll taxes are paid on these expenses. Yet such
disbursements may well provide consumption value for the
employee or partner, particularly if they include such
expenditures as first class airfare, luxury hotel
accommodations or spouses travel costs. As long as the
value to the partner of the expense equals or exceeds (1—t)
dollars for the marginal dollar expended, such expenses are
clearly justified by utility maximization.
Gwartney and Long13 extended this argument to other
aspects of the tax system by noting that many features tend
to reduce the personal cost of consumption items. They
used variations in state tax rates to consider the effect
of tax rates on the reporting of taxable income holding
gross income constant. They concluded that for taxpayers
with gross incomes in excess of $80,000, lower tax rates
would have produced more tax revenue.
Li.ndsey14 used the variation in effective marginal
tax rates induced by the peculiarities of the maximum tax—9-.-
on earned income to study a similar measure of tax
avoidance. He concluded that reducing the maximum tax rate
from 70 percent to 50 percent would probably cost the
Treasury nothing and might actually increase tax revenue.
All of these latter works stress the importance of
avoidance behavior, as opposed to factor supply, as the
prime cause of any inverse relationship between tax rates
and tax revenue.
In sum, analysis of factor supply elasticities is
insufficient to estimate the effect of changes in tax rates
on tax revenue. Analysis of the many individual supply and
demand decisions which combine to determine the personal
income tax base is exceedingly cumbersome. Therefore, the
response of revenue to tax rates is best measured in its
aggregate form. The 1982 rate reductions provided an
excellent experiment about which a number of conclusions
have already been drawn. Because tax rates were reduced
more at the top end of the income distribution, one
indicator of a behavioral response would be an increase in
the share of taxes paid by upper income groups. The Wall
Street Journal)5 began the public debate over the 1982
rate reductions in an editorial on April 11, 1984. It
examined the share of taxes paid by each income group in
1981 and 1982 and found that groups earning over $50,000
paid higher shares. The percent increases in tax shares
were most dramatic at the top.
Washington Post reporter John Berry in an April 22— 10—
storyentitled "Tax Cuts Aren't Working as Promised,"16
concluded that "Adjusted for changes in their share of
total income, the tax burden of the under $25,000 group
went up, not down, in 1982." He further argued that "the
figures show conclusively that the increase in income for
upper—bracket taxpayers is not the result of some burst of
entrepreneurial activity or of the rich getting out of tax
shelters."
Joseph Minarik17 argued in Tax Notes that:
The IRS statistics show taxes of income
groups paid in nominal dollars. Thus,
the amount of taxes paid by taxpayers
with incomes over $50,000 would increase
over time for no other reason than
inflation. An increasing share of the
taxpaying population would be pushed
over the nominal $50,000 barrier and
their taxes would therefore constitute
an increasing share of the total.
Minarik goes on to point out that the tax share paid by
people with incomes over $50,000 has risen for over a
decade and, "All else equal, this trend would be expected
to continue." He also argues that economic fluctuations
will alter the distribution of income and the stock market
could alter the level of capital gains realizations.
However, he did not quantify these effects.
Furthermore, Minarik incorrectly assumed that the tax
cut was "approximately equal in percentage terms across the
board." In reality, the reduction in the top rate from 70
percent to 50 percent in 1982 represented a 30 percent tax
cut while other groups received only a 10 percent rate— 11—
reduction.The actual situation was more complicated due
to the maximum tax on earned income. Some taxpayers
received large rate reductions while others received none
at all in these top brackets. Thus, the actual percent tax
rate reduction differed both across income groups and
within the top income group. Detailed discussions of this
effect are provided by Sunley18 and Lindsey19.
Finally, the Tax Foundation20 released figures which
appeared to contradict Minarik's analysis. They controlled
for the growth in the share of the population by decom-
posing taxpayers into percentile classes. Their results
showed that the highest 5 percent of the population
(roughly those over $50,000) paid 36.2 percent of taxes in
1982, up from 35.3 percent in 1981. However, they did not
control for changes in the income distribution or estimate
the impact of Minarikts other hypotheses.
The array of analytic techniques used by these authors
did not resolve the state of confusion regarding the effect
of the 1982 tax cuts. It is clear that the use of a
nominal dollar amount ——suchas $50,000 ——ismeaningless
in the face of inflation and rising real income. It is
equally inaccurate to use a per—tax return measure of
income above a fixed bracket. The same mathematics that
cause the total number of dollars above a certain bracket
to increase faster than inflation causes the average number
of dollars per return above that bracket to increase slower
than inflation.— 12—
Theuse of a "share of income" measure by the Post or a
"share of taxpayers" by the Tax Foundation is also
inappropriate for comparing the share of taxes paid by an
income group in two different years. Any tax code of an
uneven degree of progressivity will produce an uneven
change in the share of taxes paid after a change in income
even if income shares and taxpayer shares remain the same.
To see why this is so, consider the following example.
Assume a simplified world of 5 taxpayers each earning a
different multiple of $5,000. Assume also a simplified
multi-bracket tax code shown in Table 1 that resembles the
current U.S. tax structure.
A 20 percent rise in the general price level, which has
an equal proportionate change in everyone's income, does
not change the distribution of income among taxpayers.
Yet, every taxpayer but the top one saw an increased share
of taxes paid even though the share of income did not
change. The results are presented in Table 2.
The reason that the share of taxes went up below
$25,000 "after adjusting for the share of income" in 1982
as the Post reported was not due to behavioral responses
but because these taxpayers are on the steepest part of our
progressive rate schedule. Furthermore, although Minarik's
effect of more taxpayers being pushed above a certain
nominal bracket is correct, he did not note the counter-
vailing effect of the tax schedule reducing the share of






10,000 —15,000 500 +20%
15,000 —20,000 1,500 +30%

































































































































































































































































































































































































































TaxFoundation's use of taxpayer shares as an adjustment
understates this effect. In fact, the tax share paid by
the top 5 percent of taxpayers rose in ite of a bias in
the tax schedule against this effect.
Although tax shares are used by various authors as a
means of comparing results between two years, the above
discussion makes clear that tax shares do not provide an
adequate means of normalization. The issue of a baseline
income distribution for a given year, however, obviates the
use of tax shares to measure behavioral responses.
Instead, the reported income levels of identical groups of
taxpayers can be compared with what might be expected based
on macroeconomic trends. The next section outlines the
methodology used in this paper to estimate the behavioral
response to the 1982 tax rate reductions.
Section 2: Baseline Methodology
The discussion in the last section made clear that
comparison of taxpayer groups in two different years did
not provide a very good measure of the behavioral response
to a tax rate reduction between those two years. Three
major measurement hurdles exist. First, it is important to
compare equivalent groups of taxpayers. Second, the effect
of macroeconomic conditions on the distribution of income
must be controlled for. Finally, changes in the tax law
other than tax rates must be factored out to isolate the
effect of the rate reductions.— 16—
Abaseline income distribution automatically controls
for these factors. The distribution is created from a
detailed data base of an earlier tax year and aged to
reflect the macroeconomic conditions of the year being
studied --1982.For this study, the National Bureau of
Economic Research TAXSIM21 model was used in the
modelling process. A detailed description of how the
baseline was created is contained in Lindsey22.
However, the comparison of any two different income
distributions by income class is tricky, even an actual and
a baseline income distribution for the same year. If there
is a substantial difference between the actual and baseline
situations induced by a behavioral response, then fixed
nominal brackets are an inappropriate means of comparison,
even if the same year is being used for comparison. The
behavioral response, like a rise in nominal income between
two years, alters the number of taxpayers in each income
group by shifting the income distribution.
In order to control for this problem, the present study
measures the changes in income and taxes for fixed numbers
or percentiles of taxpayers rather than for fixed income
brackets. To form groups for comparison, all taxpayers
were ranked according to AGI in the baseline distribution.
Then, the number of taxpayers in each income bracket
reported in the 1982 Statistics of Income were matched to
the corresponding number of taxpayers in the baseline
population. For example, the Statistics of Income reported— 17—
8,408taxpayers in the top category "$1,000,000 and over."
The top 8,412 taxpayers from the baseline distribution were
selected as a comparison group. The next 20,690 taxpayers
in rank were matched to the 20,682 taxpayers in the next
SQl income bracket ——$500,000to $1,000,000. The process
was repeated until all taxpayers were grouped.
It should be noted that the baseline income
distribution is generated from a sample file of taxpayers.
Each taxpayer in the file has a sample weight greater than
unity. Thus, it was not always possible to precisely
target the desired number of taxpayers in each group.
However, as Table 3 indicates, the model was calibrated so
that the baseline number of taxpayers in each group is
extremely close to the desired actual number.
Furthermore, because the baseline and actual income
distributions were different, the dollar values of the
income brackets are also different. The top 8,408
taxpayers had incomes over $1,000,000 in the actual data,
but the top 8,412 taxpayers in the baseline distribution
had incomes as low as $767,100. Table 4 illustrates this
by describing the dollar brackets defining identical groups
of taxpayers in the actual and baseline distributions. For
descriptive ease, these taxpayer groups are referred to by
their SOl dollar brackets.
This approach compares the taxable income and taxes
paid by equal numbers of taxpayers ranked according to
their income. For example, the actual taxes paid by the— 18
TABLE 3
Number of Taxpayers in Actual



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































top8,408 taxpayers can be compared with how much we would
expect them to pay under a different set of tax rates
holding macroeconomic conditions constant.
A second advantage of using a baseline income
distribution is its ability to control for macroeconomic
conditions. The potential problems of changes in the
functional distribution of income in society due to changes
in the business cycle are avoided. Several of the authors
previously cited noted this problem, but none quantified
it. A change in the income distribution would have an
obvious consequence for the distribution of tax payments.
This is particularly important for the tax cut being
studied as there is good reason to expect that 1982 had a
different income distribution than earlier years. For
example, although aggregate personal income rose 5.9
percent between 1981 and 1982, wages and salaries rose only
5.0 percent and proprietor's income fell 30 percent. On
the other hand, personal interest income rose 7.3 percent
and transfer payments rose 11.1 percent. Because the
different components of personal income are unequally
distributed throughout the population, differing rates of
change in these components can produce a change in the
overall distribution of income.
The use of individual tax returns as the basis for the
income distribution permits adjustment for changes in the
functional distribution of income caused by those differing
rates of change. For example, it may be that the sharp— 2].—
fallin proprietary income in 1982 caused proprietors to
lose their relative position in the income distribution
while recipients of interest income rose relatively. The
creation of a baseline income distribution for 1982
automatically takes this into account.
Finally, another advantage of using a baseline rather
than an intertemporal comparison is that the tax law
changes from year to year. For example, the Economic
Recovery Act of 1981 made a number of significant changes
in the tax law which redefined Adjusted Gross Income and
altered the amount of tax owed. Two changes in particular
--theliberalization of IRA eligibility and the two earner
deduction -—significantlyaltered the definition of
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI).
The present study incorporated the effect of these
legislative changes in the baseline income estimate. In
addition, the changes in the child care credit, and the
reduction of the dividend exclusion were all simulated as
well.
Several points should be made about these data. First,
the reduction in taxes provided by these two provisions was
quite significant. Together these two provisions cost the
Treasury $13.4 billion, more than one third as much as the
rate reductions. On average, these provisions reduced
taxes 4.3 percent for 1982. The tax reduction was
particularly significant for the middle class, where these
provisions equalled more than half of the value of the rate
reductions.— 22—
Asecond point about these provisions is that studies
which used intertemporal comparisons of income or tax data
underestimated the level of income reported in 1982
relative to 1981 and therefore the potency of the
behavioral response to the tax reductions. These two
provisions, which were largely inframarginal, reduced AGI
by nearly 2 percent. This is quite significant when one
considers that nominal personal income rose only 5.9
percent between 1981 and 1982. Furthermore, considering
that the tax rate reductions increased take home pay by
only 3 percent at the margin, these other provisions
comprise a significant adjustment to income. This is
particularly true when the researcher is considering a
potential behavioral response to the rate reduction.
A final point about the IRA liberalization and two
earner deduction is that studies which measured
intertemporal tax shares neglected the relative effect of
these changes on different income groups. For example,
although taxpayers earning over $100,000 paid over 17
percent of the taxes in 1982, they received only about 7
percent of the benefits of these provisions. These
provisions increased the share of taxes paid by these upper
income groups by 0.4 percentage points. The use of a
baseline income distribution automatically takes these
changes into account. It is also possible to separate the
cost of these provisions from the impact of the rate
reductions in measuring the behavioral response of
taxpayers.— 23—
Section3: Comparison of Baj_and ActualDatafor 1982
The best summary measure of the behavioral response of
taxpayers is taxable income. Taxpayers may alter their
behavior by changing portfolio composition or consuming tax
favored commodities as well as by altering their factor
supplies. All of these behavioral changes are reflected in
taxable income. Table 5 presents the actual and baseline
taxable income for all of the various income groups
reported in the Statistics of Income.
The data show that taxable income was 33.5 percent
higher for the top taxpayer group, or top 0.01 percent of
the taxpayer population. Among the top 0.18 percent,
corresponding to taxpayers who actually reported AGI of
$200,000 or more, taxable income was $9.6 billion, or 17
percent more than the level predicted by the baseline. As
a group, these upper bracket taxpayers accounted for one
third of the total difference between the baseline and
actual levels of taxable income.
The next three taxpayer groups, comprising roughly 4.5
percent of the taxpayer population, reported taxable income
$7.2 billion higher than predicted by the baseline. This
represents a 2.9 percent increase over the baseline for
groups corresponding to those reporting between $50,000 and
$200,000 of AGI.
By contrast, the next three taxpayer groups, comprising
a bit over 23 percent of the taxpayer population, reported
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represents3.5 percent more than the baseline projected for
taxpayer groups corresponding to those earning between
$25,000 and $50,000. It seems surprising that this group
responded more than the higher income group. However, it
should be noted that the percentage reduction in tax rates
for these three groups was larger than for the groups
earning between $50,000 and $200,000. The maximum tax on
earned income had already reduced the tax rate for many of
the taxpayers in the latter group to 50 percent. There-
fore, for many of these taxpayers there was no rate
reduction in 1982 at all.
Taxpayer groups corresponding to those earning between
$15,000 and $25,000, the next 20 percent of the taxpayer
population, reported almost exactly the projected level of
taxable income. On the other hand, taxpayers in the bottom
half of the taxpayer population, corresponding to those
earning less than $15,000, reported substantially less
taxable income than the baseline predicted, about 4.2
percent less than the baseline projection.
This decline may seem puzzling until one considers what
the baseline income distribution actually represents. The
distribution extrapolated an average level of income growth
to all taxpayers based on actual data. This average level
of income growth includes the behavioral response of
taxpayers to the rate reduction, to the extent that it
affected macroeconomic aggregates. The behavioral response
was largest among upper income groups and less for other— 26—
groups.So, when the total response is averaged and
applied to all income groups, the result overestimates the
effects of macroeconomic and behavioral changes for some
taxpayers and underestimates it for others. At the lower
end of the income distribution, this overestimates the
expected change in income so much that reported taxable
income is actually below that predicted by the baseline.
Therefore, the data presented in Table 5 do not imply that
the total behavioral response to the tax reduction was
negative for low income groups.
However, the existence of an aggregate behavioral
response in addition to that included in the macroeconomic
data is unambiguous. Reported taxable income was $29
billion higher than expected by extrapolation from the
actual macroeconomic conditions of 1982. Thus, in addition
to whatever changes in nominal taxable income induced by
the tax cut, the rearrangement of portfolio, business, and
consumption behavior induced an aggregate net increase in
taxable income. Examples of this behavior include
increased use of cash instead of fringe benefits in
compensation by proprietors, reduced itemized deductions
such as charitable contributions, and the increased
realizations of capital gains. None of these would be
detectable in National Income and Product Accounts data.
Given this startling amount of response, it is useful
to examine the projections of the baseline income
extrapolation and review their plausibility. Between 1981— 27—
and1982, personal income, excluding transfers but
including personal contributions for social insurance, rose
5.6 percent. (This measure includes those components of
personal income which constitute the tax base.) Adjusting
for changes in IRA liberalization and the two earner
deduction, the baseline forecasted an increase in adjusted
gross income of 5.7 percent over the same period. By
contrast, including the response of taxpayers to the rate
cut, actual AGI was 6.3 percent higher in 1982 than in
1981. The baseline estimate therefore closely paralleled
actual macroeconomic experience while actual growth clearly
exceeded what one would expect.
A key issue raised by this response was the effect of
tax revenues. As noted above, some of the behavioral
response to the rate reductions was included in the
macroeconomic conditions used to estimate the baseline.
Thus, the measurement of the effect of the rate reductions
on tax revenue are limited to two factors: the increased
level of taxable income relative to the actual macro-
economic environment and the redistribution of that income
among income classes. Because this excludes any supply
side effect on the overall economy, it is obviously an
underestimate of the behavioral response of revenue to rate
reductions.
Analysis of the effect of the rate reduction involves
comparison of revenues under four different sets of assump-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































assumption,labelled "Baseline Tax Revenue: Old Law",
assumes that none of the changes in the Economic Recovery
Tax Act were made. This column represents the level of
revenue to be expected under pre—ERTA law given the base-
line income distribution for 1982. As no changes in tax
law were assumed, there is no reason to expect any
behavioral response. The aggregate revenue figure of
$309.7 billion is 7.7 percent more than would have been
collected in 1981 in the absence of ERTA. This compares
with a 5.6 percent rise in the tax base between these two
years.
The second column of Table 6, labelled "Baseline Tax
Revenue: Old Rates but with IRAs, etc." represents the
revenue which would have been collected if the old tax law
remained in place with the exception of the liberalized
IRAs and two earner deduction. This column facilitates
comparison with the new law by isolating the effect of tax
rates from the other changes made by ERTA. A comparison of
this column with the first column shows the cost of these
other, non—rate changes in the tax law.
The third column, labelled "Baseline Tax Revenue: New
Law" represents the level of revenue expected under the
actual tax law in place in 1982. A comparison of this
column with the other two columns shows the behavior
neutral cost of the tax cut in 1982. These costs amount to
$33.3 billion in rate reductions and $13.4 billion due to
the other provisions of the law.— 30—
Thefourth column, labelled "Actual Tax Revenue: New
Law" shows how much was actually collected in 1982. A
comparison of this column with the third column shows the
increase in revenue due to the behavioral response to the
tax reduction. In total, $15.5 billion more was collected
than what was expected given the macroeconomic environment
of 1982.
Furthermore, comparison of this fourth column with the
first column shows the actual revenue cost of the 1982 tax
cut. This actual cost is presented in the final column of
Table 6. This shows that the actual cost of the 1982
changes was $32.2 billion. On net, the behavioral response
to the rate reduction did not recoup the revenue foregone
by the tax cut.
However, among the top income groups, those with
reported AGIs of over $200,000, more revenue was actually
collected than the baseline projected would be collected
under the old, higher rate schedule. This suggests that
for these top bracket taxpayers the reduction in tax rates
actually led to an increase in tax revenues.
Furthermore, comparison of the actual revenue collected
with the estimated cost of the rate reductions shows that a
substantial fraction of the cost of the tax rate reductions
was recouped. Of the total $33.3 billion estimated cost,
$15.5 billion, or 47 percent was recaptured. This suggests
that behavior neutral revenue estimates of the cost of rate
changes may be of f by a factor of two in estimating the— 31—
revenuechange. These numbers suggest for example, that a
10 percent tax surcharge might only increase revenue by 5
percent, or alternatively, that a 10 percent tax cut might
only reduce revenue by half that amount.
Of course, the tax revenue response was not constant
across the income distribution. Only about 6 percent of
the revenue cost in the bottom income group was recouped.
This figure rose to 37 percent for taxpayers reporting
income between $20,000 and $30,000 and 51 percent for
taxpayers reporting income between $30,000 and $50,000.
Roughly half of the revenue cost of the rate reductions was
recouped in the next two income groups as well.
The behavioral response to the tax reduction also had a
profound effect on the distribution of the tax cut. Table
7 illustrates this. The first column of Table 7 shows the
effect on tax revenues of the rate reductions assuming no
behavioral response. On average, the 10 percent rate cuts
scheduled in the law cost more than 10 percent in revenue.
This is due to two factors. First, although tax rates were
cut 10 percent, tax credits were not. Thus the percent
effect of a rate reduction on revenues minus credits was
more than the percent rate cut. This is particularly true
at the lower end of the income distribution. The second
reason is the reduction in the top tax rate from 70 percent
to 50 percent and the abolition of the Maximum Tax on
Earned Income. At the very top of the income distribution

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































taxpayersjust below this group were more affected by the
maximum tax and received less benefit from the rate
reduction.
The second column includes the effect of the IRA
liberalization and the two earner deduction on the percent
change in tax revenues. This column makes clear that the
labelling of ERTA as a "tax cut for the rich" was
inaccurate. When these other provisions are included, the
smallest percent reductions occur at the top of the income
distribution. Furthermore, while the top tax bracket saw
its full cut in 1982, other tax brackets were scheduled to
be cut a further 14.5 percent during 1983 and 1984. The
two earner deduction was also scheduled to double in 1983.
When these effects are taken into account, the overall
percent reductions in taxes under ERTA were scheduled to be
two to three times greater in the middle income ranges than
at the top.
When behavioral factors are included, as illustrated by
the actual tax change shown in column 3, it becomes even
clearer that the tax reduction was skewed to the middle
income groups. Taxes at the very top of the income
distribution actually increased while other income groups
saw total tax reductions ranging up to 14.6 percent. On
average, taxes were reduced a bit over 10 percent in 1982
from the levels they otherwise would have attained.
The final column presents the percent change in taxable
income between the baseline and actual results. This— 34—
columnillustrates two important points. First, as noted
earlier, the baseline income distribution tended to
overestimate the total level of income which would have
occurred in the absence of the rate reduction. Because the
full behavioral response included in the macroeconomic
aggregates was averaged over the distribution, the lowest
income groups had a level of baseline income higher than
what they actually reported. The 2.3 percent decline in
taxable income for these groups represents an estimate of
how much additional behavioral response existed.
Second, it should be noted that a given percent change
in taxable income will present a greater percent change in
taxes. This is because of the progressive nature of the
bracket structure of the income tax. All increments to
taxable income are taxed at the taxpayer's marginal tax
rate, which is generally substantially above the taxpayer's
average rate.
For example, consider the $30,000—$50,000 income group.
The baseline effect of the tax law changes was an estimated
16.2 percent decline in taxes. But, this income group
actually saw a decline in taxes of 11 percent. The 5.2
percent difference in taxes between baseline and actual
experience is made up by an expansion of the tax base. In
this case, the base expanded by 3.7 percent. However,
because this 3.7 percent increase was taxed at the tax-
payer's marginal tax rate, a 5.2 percent increase in total
taxes ensued.— 35—
Inconclusion, the data presented here makes clear that
there was a significant behavioral response to the rate
reductions of 1982. On average, about half of the revenue
which would have been lost due to the rate reductions was
recouped. Furthermore, the data suggest that for top
bracket taxpayers, an actual increase in revenue occurred.
It therefore seems likely that the revenue maximizing top
marginal tax rate for the personal income tax is below the
70 percent statutory rate which existed prior to 1982.— 36—
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